Executive Justice, an Empirical Investigation

Testo disponibile solo in lingua inglese.
The Italian regulative machinery is desperately trying to keep up with the evolution of the market, often adapting belatedly to the system’s needs. This article deals with the problem of debt recovery (with the exception of bankruptcy proceedings) and the Italian executive justice system’s inability to meet the needs of an economic system which, as it goes global in the wake of the rest of Europe and North America, is tending increasingly to adopt new types of trade relations. The judicial instruments envisaged for debt recovery (from distraint to forced sale) are now so ineffective they seriously hamper the working of the credit market. The article is split into three parts. In the early paragraphs, the author seeks to evidence the main flaws in the course of executive justice, as well as their economic and social consequences for the creditor, for the debtor and for the community as a whole. He then demonstrates how the market compensates for the inefficiency of public institutions and concludes with a microeconomic modelling of the relationship between the productivity of the public sector and that of the private sector. In the appendix, finally, he outlines an exemplary case.