Liberal – and Feasible – Federalism

Testo disponibile solo in lingua inglese.
The most praiseworthy feature of the European Constitutional Group's project is the highly systematic nature of its content. But this is also a weakness. Its organisational proposals – especially the one to strengthen the Council's role – would risk being counterproductive, if they were implemented without strict constitutional constraints in monetary and, above all, fiscal matters. The «social» inclinations of European mass and elite political culture are, de facto, so deeply rooted that it is unrealistic to think that there will be room in the short and medium term for fiscal constitutionalism as clear-cut and explicit as that argued by the Group. To date, the chief effect of the integration process has been to improve the market compatibility of national social protection systems. There is no reason to fear that this tendency will be reversed in the future. What the world system asks of Europe today is a massive project of state-building on a continental scale. The price to pay may be a Europe with more clout than is strictly necessary. But, in view of the prize at stake, even liberals should be prepared to pay it