The Danger of Abandoning Maastricht

Testo disponibile solo in lingua inglese.
The principle that the government of the Union should be entrusted with competences such as to shape it as a «minimal state» is a good one. In real terms, though, limiting the Union's budget to 1.27% of the Community GNP appears somewhat excessive. A 2% ceiling would make more sense. It would, for example, leave room for transfers to the weaker countries, especially those of Eastern Europe. It would also allow macroeconomic policies supporting growth and employment levels, thus quelling, within some countries, the onset of unbearable tensions, the consequence of which would be protectionist pressure likely to jeopardise the single market itself. As to monetary unification, the guarantees contained in the Treaty of Maastricht are ample enough to avert the risk of monetary mismanagement. If anything, it is the opposite risk – the growing tendency to consider only a zero inflation rate as acceptable – which is a cause for concern. True, inflation has to be controlled, but descending below 2% would risk triggering a deflation process comparable to the one that is scourging Japan. Finally, to arrive at a single currency it is preferable to adhere to the convergence criteria set out in the Treaty of Maastricht according to the less stringent interpretation envisaged by article 104C, 2b and 6.